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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point One:

The defendant preserved his objection to the

introduction of the video taped viewing of the scene of the
murder which concentrated on the corpse of the victim lying upon
the couch with her throat slit open and blood upon her blouse.
He argued for the suppression of the tape in chambers.

For some

reason not explained on the record, the Court failed to have the
arguments recorded by the court reporter.

However, after the

court ruled against defendant on his motion to suppress the tape,
the court resumed session with the jury present.

The State moved

for the introduction of the tape, and the defendant brought to
the court's attention that he objected to the admission, and the
court had ruled against him.

To have said more would have

impressed the jury more firmly that he did not want them to see
the highly damaging film.

The court noted the objection, and

allowed the tape to be introduced.

Consequently, when the State

argues in the fourth point of its argument that defendant failed
to preserve his objection, the State disregards the record.
Point two:

The viewing of the video taped movie of the corpse

is so shocking and inflammatory, and has so little probative,
evidentiary value, that its introduction was clearly plain error.
Defendant should not have had
objection argued in chambers.

to do more to preserve his

Every legitimate item of evidence

which may have been included in the video tape was introduced by
the Sta£e by other means.

There was no essential evidentiary
Page 4

value to the introduction of the tape which out weighed the
unfair, prejudicial impact it had on the jury.
Point three:

While defendant did make objection to the

introduction of evidence as to Tammy DiBello's asserted fear of
defendant, the court's procedure of ruling on the objection by
taking the objection under advisement and ruling as each item was
offered on the issue, effectively allowed the evidence to come in
when defendant could not have expected it to.

There was no offer

of the testimony of Shane Jacobsen to the effect that the victim
wanted the witness to stay with her over night because she was
afraid

of the defendant.

While defendant objected to the

testimony when given, the court did not rule on the objection
until three witnesses later.

By that time, the evil of the

testimony could not be prevented by a request that the jury
disregard it.

To have sought to have the jury rehabilitated on

the point would have impressed on them all the more forcibly Mr.
Jacobsenf s comments.
Point four:

While the State is correct in arguing that

defendant did not specify the lines of the transcript in its
initial

brief wherein the prosecutor's misconduct unfairly

prejudiced the defendant, the defendant's references to the
closing argument were sufficiently well described as to permit
the State to delineate the offending portion of the transcript.
The State has addressed the issue directly, and has courteously
provided the Court with a copy of the offending comments in its
Addendum.
Page 5

The State, while referring to the specific comments, suggests
that perhaps defendant did not object timely to them.

Yet, the

portion of the transcript which the State supplied in its
addendum clearly indicates that the defendant did timely object.
Consequently, the Court had access to the offending comments of
the prosecutor and the defendant's objection.

In this case,

where the State had no compelling evidence of defendant's guilt,
and the conviction had to be based entirely on circumstantial
evidence, the misconduct of the prosecutor in arguing that the
defendant's legal counsel erred in the manner

in which he

presented the evidence, was the final error which resulted in a
guilty verdict.
Point five:

Without the color videotaped viewing of the corpse

for two or more continuous minutes, the irrelevant and immaterial
hearsay evidence that the victim feared the defendant, and the
prosecutor's unfairly characterizing the defense attorney's
manner of presenting his case, there was insufficient evidence to
cast reasonable doubt from the minds of the jurors.

There were

rational, logical conclusions to be drawn from the evidence as
viewed from the State's point of view which would
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.

Page 6

leave a

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT PRESERVED H I S OBJECTION TO THE
INTRODUCTION OF THE VIDEO TAPE VIEWING OF THE
VICTIM'S CORPSE

The

state

defendant

would

have

did not s t a t e

introduction

of

object*

page

At

defendant's

the

Court

the reason

believe

that

for

objection

his

the video tape on the r e c o r d ,
696

of

the

transcript

because
to

the
the

t h a t he did not

Mr.

Keller,

legal counsel, s t a t e d upon the S t a t e ' s offer

the

of the

video t a p e :
I previously stated my objection in chambers to
that [the portion of the tape that has been
exhibited before the court].
I believe the court
overruled that objection.
The court then admitted the video tape.

Defendant certainly

preserved his objection to the video tape by that comment.
Unfortunately, we do not have a record of the objection to the
video tape made in chambers.

Hence, there is no record of the

reasoning of the court in admitting the video.

Nevertheless, the

defendant did call to the Court's attention his objection in
chambers and the fact his objection was denied.

Consequently,

while defendant did not restate the basis of his objection, he
did note it.
Because defendant's motion to suppress was heard in chambers
during the trial of the case, before the same judge who was
trying the matter, it is distinguishable from State v. Lesley^

1

State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah, 19$3).
Page 7

where one judge heard the motion to suppress and another judge,
some period of time later tried the case.
would have had well

The trial judge here

in mind the discussion regarding the

suppression of the tape.

Consequently, to have more formally

recited again, in the presence of the jury the reasons why
defendant objected to the introduction of the tape would have
been superfluous.
Since the tape was so shocking, and inflammatory, any mention
of it in the presence of the jury was obviously going to be noted
by them.

Defendant certainly did not want to do more than object

so as to limit to the extent he was able the damage done by the
introduction of the film.

This court recognized in the Lesley

decision2 that the grounds for the objection would have to be
made outside the presence of the Jury^.

Yet, here, the record

reveals that the time of day was close to that when the Judge had
indicated he wanted to recess (Transcript p. 700), and the
defendant had only recently argued the grounds for his objection
to the judge, hence, the defendant did not ask for the jury to be
excluded.

This was not an error, but a judgment call on the part

of defense counsel as to what was necessary to preserve his
objection, in view of the court's knowledge of the objection.
Certainly the State should not now be allowed to successfully
2

id, at 82.

3ffOf course, to avoid prejudicing the j u r y , procedural steps
will have to be taken in jury t r i a l s to ensure that the court has
an o p p o r t u n i t y to hear c o u n s e l ' s o b j e c t i o n s o u t s i d e of the
presence of the jury.' 1
Page 8

argue that defendant's failure to reargue the objection a second
time before the same judge during the same trial prevents him
from assigning error to the admission.

Furthermore, Rule

103(a)(1) of the Rules of Evidence^, only requires the grounds
for the objection to be stated if it is not apparent.

Defendant

maintains that in the context of the present case, the grounds
were apparent to the trial judge.
POINT II
IRREGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION, IT WAS PLAIN
ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW THE VIDEO TAPE TO BE
SHOWN TO THE JURY
Irrespective of whether defendant objected timely to the
introduction of the video tape, the trial court committed error
in admitting that tape.

While the State has admitted that it did

not assert the video tape had essential evidentiary value, it
still argues that it was the defendant's duty to see that a
record was made of his Rule 403 objection to its introduction.
Defendant submits that the all parties and the Court itself
equally responsible to see that a record of all proceedings in
the trial of case are made on the record.

Absent a showing that

defendant specifically waived the transcription of his argument
to suppress the tape, he is entitled to rely on the Court in
preserving the record for review.

^"Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence,
a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context; . . . ." [emphasis added J.
Page )

The State admits that there was ample substantive evidence in
other exhibits that were introduced to !tmake the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."5,6
For instance, the pants, belt, socks, boots and the bloody
blouse the victim was wearing when her body was taken into
evidence were introduced by the State (Transcript pp. 698-700)
and identified by the State's witnesses, although never admitted.
A chart showing the placement of the defendant and victim's
trailer in the mobile home park was introduced and admitted
(Transcript pp. 52-53)

Another chart of the trailer court was

explained to the jury, but never admitted (Transcript pp. 501).
Photographs of the inside of the victim's trailer (Transcript,
pp. 722-725) as well as specific photographs of the victim's
corpse (Transcript pp. 54-55, 291-292) as well as a stab wound on
the body (Transcript pp. 304-305) and pictures of the trailer
door, (Transcript pp. 50-51, 338-341) were all identified and
discussed by witnesses, and introduced into evidence.

Hence, the

State is hard put to argue that the video tape was necessary to
make the charge of first degree murder more probable.

^Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence.
^At page 17 of the Respondent's brief it is stated,
"Although there were other photographs of the body that were
admitted, he [referring to defendant] does not allege that these
were gruesome or prejudicial. He appears to argue that the video
tape was prejudicial because it was cumulative of other evidence."
Page 10

The State has argued that photographic evidence of the corpse
is not inadmissible simply because it is cumulative.?

Defendant

agrees as far as that argument goes, but the State fails to make
a distinction between evidence which is merely cumulative, and
that which has less relevance than it does unfair prejudice."
As the State so amply discusses, at pp. 18 and 19 of its Brief,
and as the Defendant mentions on page 24 of his Brief, this Court
has determined that before "potentially prejudicial photographs
of the victim1 s body" are to be admitted, the Court must find
that the potential undue prejudice of the photographs
outweighed

by the "essential" evidentiary

photographs.9

value of the

in Garcia^Q, still pictures of the stab wounds in

the body were admitted properly.
essential.

is

The Court found they were

Here, in addition to photographs of the stab wounds,

the State has introduced over defendant's objection video movies
of the corpse.

This cumulative, shocking and inflammatory

evidence was not essential to the State's case.
The State argues that the video tape showing Tammy DiBello's
body for two minutes is not as gruesome as photographs which were
found to be objectional in other cases which have come before the
7". . . The mere fact that the evidence was cumulative of
other testimony shouLd not render the photographs inadmissible."
Page 22 of Respondent's Brief.
8

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.

9

State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah, 1983).

Instate v. Garcia, ibid.
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Court**

and

that

the tape

evidentiary value,"12

anc[

is "not completely

devoid of

indicates that the video viewing of

the body "is no more graphic than many currently popular movies
and television programs. "13

Apparently, the State is arguing

that if the video is not "complete devoid of evidentiary value"
it is admissible, in spite of Rule 403, and irrespective of its
degree of gruesomeness.
Certainly, this Court should not be called upon to determine
whether the Court erred in admitting the video pictures of
victim's bodies based on their degree of gruesomeness!

Defendant

disputes Respondent's assertion the view of the body is no more
gruesome than current television shows.

It shows in color the

slit throat of the corpse, lying on the couch, and without moving
from that scene, remains so fixed for over two minutes!
The degree of gruesomeness is not direct issue.

As this Court

stated in Garcia*^, Cloud*5, Poe*6 , and Wells*?, the issue is
whether the pictures are necessary for the State to prove
relevant evidence.

Here, defendant allowed, without objection,

evidence depicting the scene, the stab wounds and bruises on the
**Respondent's Brief, second paragraph at page 20.
^Respondentfs Brief, first paragraph, at p#ge 21.
^Respondentf s Brief, page 22.
Instate v. Garcia, ibid.
*5State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah, 1986).
16

State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 514-515 (Utah, 1986).

*7State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah, 1983).
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victim to be admitted.

Certainly, after those pictures were

admitted properly, there is no good reason, except as this Court
stated in Wells*8 to introduce the video tape for the "hoped for
emotional impact on the jury."
Clearly, the Court abused ies discretion in allowing the video
tape to be admitted.

Rule

*03 requires the Court to make a

determination that injustice will not result before cumulative,
highly emotional evidence such as this tape are introduced. 19
This Court is called upon to reverse the defendant's conviction
to correct this manifest injustice.
POINT III
IT WAS MATERIAL PREJUDICE FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THE DECEDENT'S
STATE OF MIND TO REMAIN BEFORE THE JURY
After the jury was selected in this case, the court excused
them to hear the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of
the victim's alleged fear of the defendant, which the State
sought to introduce by means of Rule 804(b)(5) of the Rules of
Evidence.

(Transcript pp. 4-9, 10). Defendant based his motion

to suppress primarily upon the Wauneka.20

xhe defendant argued

that since there was no dispute as to the fact that the victim
had been murdered, it was totally irrelevant what her state of
18

State v. Wells, ibid at 813.

19

State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah, 1982) cite
with approval in State vTRoyball, 710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah, 1985)
2Q

State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377, (Utah, 1977).
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mind was at the time of her death. 21

The Court agreed and

granted the motion to suppress evidence of Tammy's state of mind.
(Transcript p. 24, 1. 16-17).

Defendant then asked that the

ruling apply to any evidence of which defendant had no knowledge
on the issue. (Transcript, p. 24, 1. 19-22).

The court did not

make a ruling, but stated: HWe won't make that ruling until-I'm

not going to prejudge." (Transcript p. 24, 1. 23-24).

Subsequently, the Court modified its ruling even more, and stated
that it would exclude the hearsay, state of mind evidence from
the State's opening statement only, and then rule on each
witnesses testimony after the foundation for that testimony was
laid.22
The Court's ruling on the suppression of the state of mind of
the victim was in error, and the State's present position that

21"i think essentially that what the Utah Supreme Court was
saying is that the state of mind of the deceased, her attitude
toward the defendant, her fear perhaps of the defendant, is not
in issue in a homicide case where there is no question of
suicide, no question of accidental death or a question of selfdefense, whereas in this case it's a whodunit. That is to say,
the defendant denies any involvement whatsoever in the homicide.
There is a great danger in allowing the jury to hear evidence and
testimony from individuals who say, well, the man's wife told me
she was afraid of him or that he might injure her, because the
jury may simply conclude from that, well, then the defendant must
be guilty." Transcript, page 6.
22

Transcript pp. 25-26: "The court is going to reserve its
ruling as to the introduction of hearsay statements until such
time as the state has put on its case and laid a foundation on
which statements can be offered in evidence. At that time the
defense may raise the motion and object to the admission of said
evidence and the court will then make a ruling as to whether or
not the hearsay statements are admissible and come within the
exception to the hearsay rule."
Page 14

Shane Jacobsen's testimony quoted on page 14 of Respondent's
Brief, should not have been allowed to stand before the Court.
The case cited by defendant at the motion to suppress, State v.
Wauneka,23 clearly prohibits the introduction of this testimony
as being irrelevant.24

There was no good reason for the court to

require the defendant to object as each witness was qualified to
offer the evidence of Tammy's state of mind.

The very evil which

should have been anticipated by such a ruling occurred.

Without

warning, and foundation, Shane Jacobsen testified that Tammy was
afraid of the defendant and wanted him to sleep at her house as a
consequence.

(Transcript p. 162.)

Defendant immediately

approached the bench and a discussion ensued.

The Court did not

rule on the issue until Mr. Keller brought up the matter again
when the State began to qualify Tinley Gibbons as a witness.
(Transcript p. 277).

Mr Keller approached the bench and the

Court excluded the jury from the court room.

The court then

stated that he was not going to allow the witness to state her
answers to the prosecutor's questions unless the jury was
present, and then he was going to let Mr. Keller object.
(Transcript p. 279).

Obviously, the trial court did not

understand the damaging effect, and materially prejudicial effect
2^State y, Wauneka, ibid.
2^See Appellant's brief at pp. 13-14, and State v. Wauneka
ibid, at 1381. "Whether the victim loved or hated the defendant
or whether she feared him or ignored him throws no light on hi
guilt or innocence. The jurors were most likely to believe tha
the statements made by the wife were true, and that the defendan
had beaten her and threatened to kill her; therefore, he did kil
her."
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of the state of mind, hearsay testimony.
referred

The defendant again

to the Court to the Wauneka decision, and to the

weighing test of Rule 403.

(Transcript p. 283). At page 286 of

the Transcript, the defendant then expressed that the Court had
never ruled on his objection to Shane Jacobsen's testimony.25
The Court never instructed the jury on the matter, and the answer
was allowed to remain before the jury.
The State argues now that the answer was permissible because
defendant had introduced evidence to the effect that the blood on
the door of the trailer was from a bloody nose that Tammy got
when she tripped and fell after leaving her neighbor's trailer
with the defendant on the evening before her death.26

yet

defendant never argued with the fact that Tammy was murdered, and
the evidence of her state of mind can only be relevant if the
issue of the means of death was at issue.

25 Mr. Keller: When shane Jacobsen was testifying he made
the statement and I entered an objection and went to the bench
and asked the opportunity to make the objection outside the
presence of the jury.
Mr. Jacobsen made the flat statement, I believe, that the
deceased was afraid of her husband.
The Court: Yes, I have that.
Mr. Keller: And therefore she asked him to stay. I make that
objection because the Court has not made a final ruling on that
and I want the record clear that I am objecting to that statement
coming in if the Court rules in our favor. I think that's all
that need to be done is my objection for the record.
The Court: And that answer will be stricken. If the court
determines otherwise, the court can reverse itself and allow that
answer to remain. We can recall and reestablish that issue.
^Respondent's Brief, p. 15.
Page 16

The Court erred in allowing the testimony by Shane Jacobsen to
remain before the jury, and based on the reasoning

in the

Wauneka^7 decision, the defendant's conviction should be
reversed.
POINT IV
THE PROSECUTt^'S MISCONDUCT TAINTED THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDINGS
While the State is correct when it states that the defendant
failed to specify the pages of the transcript containing the
prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument.

However, the

defendant's argument delineated that misconduct sufficiently well
for the State to locate the same in the transcript, refer to it
by page in its brief,28
Addendum to its Brief.

an d

include the pages referred to in its

Consequently, this Court has had the

opportunity to review the offending passages.

The case cited by

the State for the proposition that failure to refer to the pages
of the record requires the court to assume regularity, State v.
Olmos29

was

not

decided on the basis of the defendant's failure

to refer to pages of the transcript, but on the Court lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter.

The case cited in dicta on

the issue at hand, State v. Jones,30 involves jury instructions.
2?State y, Wauneka, ibid.
^Respondent's Brief, page 8, and Addendum.
29

State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah, 1986).

30state v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah, 1982).
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POINT V
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED WITHOUT ERROR, STANDING
ALONE, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME REASONABLE
DOUBT AS TO DEFENDANT'S GUILT
Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law, depends upon what
evidence the jury had the right to receive.33

jf the evidence is

"so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to [defendant's]
guiltff3^, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable
to the verdict, then the Court must reverse.
Defendant takes exception to certain implications of the
State's recitation of the evidence.

Firstly, defendant submits

that there was no evidence other than defendant's testimony that
Tammy was bleeding because of her fall.

None of the witnesses

counterdicted defendant's testimony that she did in fact fall and
cut her mouth.

Though defendant had blood on his own body, there

was no indication as to whose blood it was.

Since defendant

explained how Tammy's blood or his own could have been on him,
and his truck there is no reason to believe the jury would
believe it was the result of the murder.

There was no evidence

to indicate the blood traces on his skin and on the instrument
33state v. McCardell, 562 P.2d 942 (Utah, 1982): "Th
question of the sufficiency of evidence to support the convictic
will necessarily depend upon a determination of what evidence wa
properly before the jury.11
34

State v. Christensen, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah, 1986)
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handles in the truck were the result of the murder.

The state

did not introduce any evidence that Tammy's body was ever
transported in the truck.

The two strands of hair in Tammy's

left had could not be identified as being from the defendant, and
the one strand of hear found in her right hand could only be
identified as being "similar11.
excluded as being his.
be

In other words, it couldn't be

None of the three strands of hair could

identified as being defendants. (Transcript pp. 436-437).
Sonja Fajen, whose testimony is recorded at pp. 257-274 of the

transcript, did not hear an argument about clothing as the State
implies at p. 12 of its brief, and she did not hear a loud truck
for at least a half an hour after she heard the door to the
DiBello trailer slam.
Chris Graham, whose testimony is recorded at pp. 496-517,
indicated in his testimony that he did hear a women tell a man to
take his clothes out of the trailer, but he could not tell who
the man and women were, or which trailer the talking was coming
from.
Consequently, the defendant submits that the jury did not have
sufficient evidence as a matter of law to exclude every
reasonable hypotheses except defendant's guilt^5#

Since the

evidence in this case is purely circumstantial, the Court is
bound to look upon it with caution, and find that it excludes
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant.36
35

State v. Schad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970).

36 i d .
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Since it does not, defendant is entitled to an acquittal, or at
least a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
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